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THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN WISCONSIN:
STATUS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT, REVISITED
MICHAEL A. LAWRENCE*
This Comment surveys Wisconsin parol evidence cases decided from 1980
through mid-1991. Drawing upon a 1972 New York University Law Review ar-
ticle for its methodology, the Comment empirically examines whether it is useful
to categorize Wisconsin decisions according to the business sophistication (i.e.,
"status") of parties to the contract. The author concludes that status is important
in Wisconsin parol evidence cases, despite the fact that courts rarely mention it
as a factor. The data indicate that the nature of the proffered parol evidence is
important as well.
The author suggests that the results of this law-in-action survey are useful
to parties, attorneys, and courts alike-to parties and attorneys by improving
their odds of prevailing on parol evidence issues, and to courts by giving them
additional rationale with which to circumvent or uphold the rigid application
of the parol evidence rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, Robert Childres and Stephen J. Spitz published a law
review article' in which they tested their belief that business sophis-
tication (i.e., "status") of the parties to the contract is a significant factor
in contract litigation. By establishing a tentative system of status ca-
tegorization and applying it to a group of cases dealing with the parol
evidence rule,2 they discovered they could predict the outcomes of most
parol evidence decisions on the basis of the parties' status. They divided
a sample of 149 state appellate court cases decided between 1969 and
19703 into three categories, labelled: 1) formal contracts (transactions
between parties with some expertise and business sophistication; i.e.,
agreements are negotiated fairly and in detail), 2) informal contracts
(transactions between parties who lack business sophistication), and 3)
abuse-of-bargaining-power contracts (e.g., contracts of adhesion and
unconscionable contracts as well as contracts objectionable on public
* Class of 1992, University of Wisconsin Law School. I would like to thank Professor
Stewart Macaulay for his helpful remarks on early drafts of this Comment. Heartfelt thanks
also to Deanne Lawrence for her support and encouragement.
1. Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (1972).
2. In short, the parol evidence rule states that a written contract made by the
parties supersedes promises made in earlier negotiations. Joseph M. Calamari & John D.
Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles of Contract Interpretation,
42 IND. L.J. 333, 334 (1967) (citing 3 ARTHUR L. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (rev'd ed. 1960);
CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 213 (1954)).
3. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 7. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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policy grounds).4 They concluded that in light of courts' varying treat-
ment of the parol evidence rule in the different status categories, a
unitary view5 of the rule was not valid. Rather, the study indicated
that the parol evidence rule functions effectively only in cases assigned
to the "formal contracts" category.6
This Comment's examination of fifty-nine Wisconsin appellate
cases decided from 1980 through mid-19917 reveals that, although the
Wisconsin courts expressly state the parol evidence rule along tradi-
tional lines' and rarely mention the parties' status, their decisions 9
support the basic Childres and Spitz conclusions with striking fre-
quency. Specifically, Wisconsin courts found parol evidence admissible
in only ten of twenty formal cases,' 0 as compared to twenty of twenty-
five informal cases" and nine of ten abuse-of-bargaining-power cases. '
2
4. Id. at 3.
5. Essentially, the unitary view stands for the proposition that the parol evidence
rule is applicable to all contracts. Id. at 1.
6. Id. at 7.
7. The surveyed cases consisted of all reported decisions since 1980, as well as all
unreported decisions since 1983, found by the LEXIS search "parol w/5 evidence and (date
aft 1/1/80)" (States library, Wise file). Eight cases within the parameters were not applicable
(i.e., the opinions mentioned the words "parol" and "evidence", but the parol evidence rule
was not at issue in the cases).
8. The traditional statement of the rule holds that when the parties intend the
writing to be the final expression of their agreement, parol evidence may not be admitted
except in cases of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text.
9. Attempting to classify parties' status in the surveyed cases is inherently difficult.
For instance, because the facts rarely make clear the details of the parties' level of business
sophistication, one needs to make broad assumptions. In general, this Comment adheres to
the following guidelines. First, if both parties were incorporated or appeared to be businesses
larger than the "mom and pop" variety, the agreement in question was deemed formal.
Second, if one or both parties did not satisfy these criteria, the agreement was deemed
informal. Third, if there were allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or other abuses,
the agreement was classified in the abuse-of-bargaining-power category. Fourth, if one of the
parties sought to exclude a subsequent agreement on parol evidence grounds, the case was
classified as a potential misapplication. Despite the possibility that a case may have fit in
two or even three of the categories, every effort was made to be consistent.
10. See infra notes 78-89, 96-108, 116-20, 135-38 and accompanying text. When
broken down further, the results in the formal category become more interesting. Wisconsin
courts held parol evidence admissible in none of the eight formal "substitution" cases, as
compared to two of the three formal "variations" cases, four of the four formal "side agree-
ments" cases, and four of the five formal "interpretation" cases.
By comparison, the courts in the Childres and Spitz survey found parol evidence
admissible in 25 of 41 non-misapplication formal cases. See infra notes 73-77, 94-95, 111-
115, 125-34 and accompanying text. Specifically, courts held it admissible in only two of the
13 substitution cases and none of the four formal variations cases, as compared to 12 of the
15 formal side agreements cases and II of the 12 formal interpretation cases.
11. See infra notes 151-68 and accompanying text. The courts in the Childres &
Spitz study admitted parol evidence in 37 of the 40 informal cases. See infra notes 141-150
and accompanying text. See also infra notes 13, 165-74 and accompanying text for discussion
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Another dynamic appears to be at work in Wisconsin as well.
Specifically, the Wisconsin courts appear to implicitly consider the na-
ture of the proffered parol evidence in their decisions. When a party
attempts to directly substitute alleged prior understandings for the un-
ambiguous meaning of the terms of the written agreement, Wisconsin
courts generally will not allow the evidence, regardless of whether the
parties are formal or informal.' 3
Finally, Wisconsin courts misapplied the parol evidence rule in
two of the six cases in which one of the parties sought to exclude
evidence of an agreement subsequent to the original written agree-
ment. 14 Appendix Table 1 summarizes the results of the Wisconsin
survey.
These data have important implications for parties and attorneys
litigating parol evidence issues in Wisconsin. Armed with the knowl-
edge that the courts consider (whether consciously or unconsciously)
the parties' status and the nature of the proffered parol evidence when
deciding parol evidence issues, attorneys can attempt to categorize or
"pigeon-hole" their clients' disputes accordingly. Generally, an attorney
wishing to have the court admit parol evidence should attempt to char-
acterize the evidence as anything but a substitution.I5 Instead, the at-
torney should attempt to paint the client's agreement as an informal
16
or abuse-of-bargaining-power contract. If it is not possible to remove
the client from the formal category, the attorney should characterize
the agreement as a side agreement, an ambiguous agreement, or perhaps
even as a variation. ' 7 Conversely, an attorney wishing to exclude parol
of an important distinction between the Childres & Spitz results and the Wisconsin results
in the informal category.
12. See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text. The courts in the Childres &
Spitz survey found parol evidence admissible in 43 of the 50 abuse-of-bargaining-power cases.
See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
13. Of the 25 Wisconsin informal cases, eight involved substitutions. The courts
allowed parol evidence in only three of those eight cases, as compared to allowing it in all
17 of the remaining informal cases. See infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
14. The parol evidence rule does not apply to subsequent agreements because such
agreements presumably supersede the original written agreement. See infra note 199. The
courts in the Childres & Spitz survey misapplied the rule in two of the eight cases involving
subsequent agreements. See infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
15. The Wisconsin courts allowed parol evidence in only three of the 16 combined
formal and informal substitution cases. See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text; notes
166-68 and accompanying text.
16. The courts occasionally find justification for allowing parol evidence in informal
substitution cases, but they appear to virtually never allow it in formal substitution cases.
See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text; notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text; notes 135-38 and accompanying
text; notes 96-108 and accompanying text. Courts are much more likely to admit parol
evidence, even if the contract is formal, if the evidence demonstrates the existence of side
agreement or a variation on the agreement (or if the evidence clarifies an ambiguous agree-
ment) than if the evidence merely substitutes new terms into the written agreement. Wisconsin
10731991:1071
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evidence should attempt to characterize the client's agreement as a
formal substitution contract or, if that is not possible, as an informal
substitution contract.
The data also carry implications for the courts. By understanding
that their parol evidence decisions follow certain patterns according to
the parties' status and the nature of proffered parol evidence, courts
give themselves additional rationale with which to circumvent or up-
hold the rigid application of the parol evidence rule. '8 Furthermore, if
litigants, counsel and courts recognize the significance of the parties'
status and nature of the proffered parol evidence, all concerned will be
better able to predict prospective decisions, which would improve the
efficiency and perceived fairness of the judiciary system.' 9
With one exception, 20 this Comment retains the Childres and Spitz
system of status categorization as the framework for its analysis of fifty-
nine Wisconsin appellate decisions. Part II investigates the parol evi-
dence rule and discusses various commentators' opinions as to how
courts should interpret and apply the rule; Part III describes the
Childres & Spitz methodology and then, within each status subcategory,
analyzes the Wisconsin cases; and Part IV concludes that the Childres
and Spitz system of categorization is a useful model for analyzing and
predicting parol evidence cases in Wisconsin.
II. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
A. History
The parol evidence rule has long been a source of confusion and
controversy in contract law. Professor Wigmore said the rule was "the
most discouraging subject in the whole field of evidence." 21 Professor
Thayer noted that "[flew things are darker than this, or fuller of subtle
difficulties."' 22 The subject is not merely an academic exercise; indeed,
most reported contracts decisions involve not such traditional contracts
issues as offer and acceptance but rather involve the parol evidence
rule and questions of interpretation. 23
courts allowed parol evidence in ten of the twelve cases that fell into the non-substitution
categories.
18. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 56 and accompanying text; note 66 and accompanying text.
20. This Comment separates out "misapplication of the parol evidence rule" from
the formal category. See infra note 198.
21. 9 JOHN H. WIOMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Evi-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2400, at 3 (3d ed. 1940).
22. JAMES THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE OF EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
390 (1898).
23. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 2, at 333.
1074
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Legal scholars trace the rule's origins to "a primitive formalism
which attached mystical and ceremonial effectiveness to the carta and
the seal."24 Courts today expect this vestigial brand of formalism to
accomplish many objectives. Some courts see the rule as insisting that
parties use proper form when expressing their agreements, while others
see it as a method of protecting an intention to integrate a transaction
into one final and complete repository.2 5 Such courts believe that a
major function of the rule is the prevention of fraud and perjury, which
could result from allowing oral testimony that does not correspond
precisely with the written agreement and which "may be the product
of faulty memory, wishful thinking, or outright prevarication. ' 26 Other
courts, doubtful of the trustworthiness of evidence, concerning prior
oral agreements and fearful that fact-finders will not appreciate the need
for stability and certainty. in commercial dealings, expect the rule to
improve the quality of judicial resolution of disputes. 27 This is done
by precluding finders of fact, especially juries, from considering evi-
dence of prior oral agreements. 28 At least one commentator asserts that
this "distrust of the jury as a reliable mechanism for divining the truth"
is the fundamental purpose underlying the parol evidence rule. 29 The
rationale has been that jurors may unfairly "favor underdogs" and "lack
the sophistication needed to deal effectively with complex commercial
transactions involving numerous alleged oral and written contract
terms." 30 Accordingly, where the parties' last expression is in writing,
the jury takes no part in determining the parties' intentions; instead,
the trial judge decides.
The parol evidence rule has thus evolved over time into what one
commentator calls a "maze of conflicting tests, subrules, and exceptions
adversely affecting both the counseling of clients and the litigation pro-
cess. Whether the rule has played a significant role in inducing con-
tracting parties to put their entire agreement into one final writing is,
at best, doubtful."'"
B. The Rule Defined
The parol evidence rule applies to prior or contemporaneous
expressions and does not apply to any agreements or expressions made
24. Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Con-
quest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1386 (1983) (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 211, at 430
n.4; WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2426.
25. Id. at 1386 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at,1386-87.
27. Justin Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment
of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1968) (citations omitted).
28. Id.
29. Metzger, supra note 24, at 1387.
30. Id. at 1387-88.
31. Id.
1991:1071 1075
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subsequent to the writing.32 This writing is characterized either as a
total or a partial integration:
Where the writing is intended to be final and complete, it is
characterized as a total integration and may be neither con-
tradicted nor supplemented by evidence of prior agreements
or expressions. But where the writing is intended to be final
but incomplete, it is said to be a partial integration; although
such writing may not be contradicted by evidence of prior
agreements or expressions, it may be supplemented by evi-
dence of consistent additional terms. Thus, in approaching a
writing, two questions must be asked: (1) Is it intended as a
final expression? (2) Is it intended to be a complete expres-
sion?33
The difficulties with the parol evidence rule stem from basic dis-
agreements as to the rule's meaning and effect and goals to be achieved
in interpreting the contract.14 Professor Williston states the rule as
follows: "IT]his rule requires, in the absence of fraud, duress, mutual
mistake, or something of the kind, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence,
oral or written, where the parties have reduced their agreement to an
integrated writing." 35 Similarly, Professor Corbin posits that: "When
two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to
which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration
of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent
understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose
of varying or contradicting the writing." 36
Williston's and Corbin's apparent agreement, however, masks an
underlying fundamental disagreement. Although both agree that any
relevant evidence is admissible to show the writing was not intended
to be final,37 they use the term "intent" in this context in strikingly
dissimilar ways.38 Their disagreement focuses on the concept of what
comprises "total integration." Corbin means the actual expressed in-
tentions of the parties, where total integration depends on "what the
parties thereto say and do at the time they draw that instrument....
Implicit in Corbin's statement is the fact that much of what the parties
32. Calamari & PerillO, supra note 2, at 335 (citing, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 2, §
574; 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 632 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
33. Id. at 335 (citing WILLISTON, supra note 32, § 636).
34. Id. at 333.
35. Id. at 334 (citing WILLISTON, supra note 32, § 631).
36. Id. at 334 (citing CORBIN, supra note 2, § 573).
37. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 588; WILLISTON, supra note 32, § 633 n.,13; RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 228, cmt. a (1932).
38. Id. at 337.
39. Id. at 339 (citing CORBIN, supra note 2, § 582).
1076
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say and do at the time they draw the instrument is not incorporated
into the writing. Williston, on the other hand, refuses to consider out-
side evidence of what the intent actually was, instead relying solely
upon the writing as a complete expression of the parties' intent.40
C. The Rule Today
In short, not everyone agrees as to the proper statement and ap-
plication of the parol evidence rule. The modem trend of thinking is,
as Williston himself conceded, "toward increasing liberality in the ad-
mission of parol agreements." 4 The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts42 and the Uniform Commercial Code43 "add momentum"
to this view:44 the Restatement by rejecting the notion that the writing
itself can "prove its own completeness" and that "wide latitude must
be allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on the intention of
the parties;" 45 and the Code by suggesting that partial integration is
the norm 46 and that a court will bar evidence of consistent additional
terms only when it "finds the writing to have been intended also as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement."
47
Other commentators agree. Professor Justin Sweet suggests that
even very carefully drafted contracts will occasionally inadvertently
omit agreements upon which the parties have agreed.48 In such cases,
although a strict interpretation of the parol evidence would not allow
40. Williston's rationale for looking only within the "four comers" of the writing
is that reliance on the existence of a collateral oral agreement to determine intent would
emasculate the parol evidence rule, since the mere existence of such an oral agreement would
conclusively indicate that the parties intended only a partial integration and that the only
question presented would be whether they actually made the alleged collateral agreement. Id.
at 337-38 (citing WILLISTON, supra note 32, § 633).
41. Metzger, supra note 24, at 1397 (citing WILLISTON, supra note 32, § 638).
42. Id. at 1397 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210 cmt. b (1981);
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 3-3, at Ill (2d ed. 1977)).
43. Id. at 1396-97 (citing U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977); George I. Wallach, The Declining
"Sanctity" of Written Contracts-The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol
Evidence Rule, 44 Mo. L. REV. 651, 666-67 (1979)).
44. Id. at 1397.
45. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210 cmt. b (1981)).
46. Id. at 1396 (citing Wallach, supra note 43, at 665; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 42, § 3-7).
47. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1977)). Furthermore, the writing is considered
"complete and exclusive" only if the additional terms "if agreed upon .... would certainly
have been included in the document." Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (1977) (emphasis
added)). This standard for complete integration is much narrower and more stringent than
Williston's "naturally and normally" test. Id. (citing Wallach, supra note 43, at 668). Evidence
of course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of trade are allowed by the Code to
explain or supplement the terms included in the writing, "even when this evidence appears
to contradict apparently unambiguous terms in the writing." Id. (citing, inter alia, U.C.C. §
2-202(a) (1977); Wallach, supra note 43, at 665-66).
48. Sweet, supra note 27, at 1064.
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evidence of the agreement, Sweet proposes that courts should consider
a number of other factors4 9 in deciding whether a written document
was intended as a complete and final expression of the parties' contract.
One result of the liberalization of the parol evidence rule and
dissatisfaction with its rigid application is that judges have shoe-homed
fact situations into categories in which the rule is inapplicable.50 For
instance, to circumvent the rule, courts have found fraud and granted
contract reformation in situations in which these concepts are not or-
dinarily applicable.5 Moreover, they have developed whole categories
of exceptions. For example, exceptions to strict application of the rule
are routinely made for ambiguity52 and partial integration. 3 These
various judicial manipulations are further evidence of the modern trend
toward liberality in applying the parol evidence rule and of the con-
fusion and inconsistency surrounding its application.54
Unfortunately, because manipulation of the rule varies from judge
to judge,55 the outcome of any particular case involving parol evidence
remains difficult to predict:
Although the outcome of a case is often correct because courts,
as a rule, have a good sense of fairness, there are cases that
simply come out wrong. There are non-result-oriented judges
who mechanically follow cases phrasing the Rule in its tra-
ditional form. Other judges, believing the Rule expresses a
sound judicial policy, may refuse to admit the testimony of
the oral agreement even if they believe the agreement took
place and was intended to stand.5 6
D. The Rule in Wisconsin
Courts in Wisconsin are guided by the interpretation of the parol
evidence rule set forth by the state supreme court in Federal Deposit
49. For instance, courts should consider, inter alia, length of the negotiation; im-
portance and complexity of the transaction; and, as Childres and Spitz expanded upon four
years later in their NYU Law Review article (see Childres & Spitz, supra note 1), the business
experience of the parties. Id. at 1064-66. Another factor is whether the parties entered into
the transaction on the advice of professionals. See infra note 70.
50. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 2, at 342.
51. Id.
52. See. e.g., Patti v. Western Machine Co., 241 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Wis. 1976). See
infra notes 61, 62 and accompanying text.
Another difficult aspect of the parol evidence question is that one could argue that all
language is inherently ambiguous, which suggests courts should always hold parol evidence
admissible.
53. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
54. Metzger, supra note 24, at 1398.
55. Indeed, some attorneys see little pattern in the courts' behavior with respect to
the parol evidence rule. The author, in a completely unscientific sampling, surveyed several
Madison and Milwaukee attorneys who opined that judges sometimes appear quite arbitrary
in their actions, to the point where the disposition of a parol evidence issue seems to hinge
as much as anything on the judge's mood on that particular day.
56. Sweet, supra note 27, at 1046.
1078
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Insurance Corp. v. First Mortgage Investors,17 which states, "[w]hen
the parties to a contract embody their agreement in writing and intend
the writing to be the final expression of their agreement, the terms of
the writing may not be varied or contradicted by evidence of any prior
written or oral agreement in the absence of fraud, duress, or mutual
mistake."58 As stated, the Wisconsin rule does not instruct how courts
shall determine "intent." The classic Williston/Corbin dichotomy59
thus is not explicitly resolved. For example, several courts have held
that a court must disregard parol evidence of the intention of the parties,
even if it has been introduced into the record unopposed by counsel,
when it directly conflicts with express provisions of the contract.60 This
decision suggests that the certainty of the written contract is valued
over the true intentions of the parties, a result of which Williston would
likely approve.
On the other hand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held parol
evidence always "admissible to show whether the parties intended to
assent to the writing as the final and complete (or partial) statement
of their agreement."-6 1 When written terms in an instrument are am-
biguous, parol evidence is admissible to help explain those terms. 62
The only factor that would limit this policy would be the existence of
an unambiguous "merger clause," which absent claims of duress, fraud,
or mutual mistake expressly negates other understandings and makes
the document a complete integration; 63 or more narrowly, the existence
of a specific clause in the writing that clearly sets out the terms in
dispute.64 When either is ambiguous, "[t]he general rule is that am-
biguous contracts are to be construed against the maker or drafter;" 65
that is, parol evidence is admissible to prove the meaning of the in-
tegration clause.
E. Summary
In the end, the pervasive uncertainty about the parol evidence rule
tends to undermine the perception for many that justice is being ad-
ministered fairly:
57. 250 N.W.2d 362 (Wis. 1977).
58. Id. at 365; see also Dairyland Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Bohen (In re Spring Valley
Meats, Inc.), 288 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Wis. 1980).
59. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
60. Morn v. Schalk, I I N.W.2d 80, 84 (Wis. 1961). See also, Federal Deposit Insur.
Corp., 250 N.W.2d at 365; Dairyland Equip., 288 N.W.2d at 855; Conrad Milwaukee Corp.
v. Wasilewski, 141 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Wis. 1966).
61. Federal Deposit Insur. Corp., 250 N.W.2d at 366.
62. O'Connor Oil Corp. v. Warber, 141 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Wis. 1966).
63. Dairyland Equip., 288 N.W.2d at 855-59 (citing, e.g., Matthew v. American
Family Mutual Ins. Co., 195 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Wis. 1972); CORBIN, supra note 2, § 578, at
402-03, 411).
64. Dairyland Equip., 288 N.W.2d at 855.
65. Id. at 856; Bank of Sun Prairie v. Opstein, 273 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Wis. 1979);
Garriguenc v. Love, 226 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Wis. 1975).
1991:1071 1079
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The by-product of almost every parol evidence dispute is a
client who is angry either because he has not been given his
day in court or because the opposing party has been permitted
to prove an oral agreement that the client claims was not made
and which his attorney assured him could not be proven.66
In the context of this confusion, Childres and Spitz developed their
methodology of status categorization. When they applied their system
to a sample of parol evidence cases to see if it had any predictive value,
they found that courts in general were much less likely to allow parol
evidence in cases involving formal contracts than they were in cases
involving informal contracts and abuse-of-bargaining-power con-
tracts.67 The study indicated that the parol evidence rule functions
effectively only in cases assigned to the formal contracts category. 68
III. THE CHILDRES & SPITZ STATUS METHODOLOGY:
WHERE WISCONSIN FITS IN
Childres and Spitz divided contracts into three groups: formal,
informal, and abuse-of-bargaining-power. Each of the three major cat-
egories were then divided into more specific subcategories. They ap-
plied their framework to the 149 cases relevant to the parol evidence
rule cited in volumes ten through fifteen of West's General Digest,
Fourth Series. 69
A. Formal Contracts
The surveyed decisions in the formal category-fairly negotiated
contractual relations between parties with significant expertise and
knowledge7°-generally rejected the Wigmore/Corbin liberalized view
that courts may upset finality of the written contract. For the most part,
Childres & Spitz applauded the courts' actions in these cases, stating
that sound policy supported the rejection of extrinsic evidence in formal
contract cases. 7' They suggested, however, that in some cases the court
66. Sweet, supra note 27, at 1046.
67. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 7.
68. Id. The parol evidence rule was rarely applied in the Childres and Spitz cases
involving informal contracts, and the rule had no application at all in abuse-of-bargaining-
power contracts.
69. Id. These volumes reported cases nationwide decided between 1969 and 1970.
70. Examples of formal contracts include complex loan agreements, transactions
between merchants covered by the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), contracts between
large businesses, large construction contracts, and contracts between persons who enter into
transactions on the advice of professionals such as brokers, lawyers or investment counselors.
Id. at 4.
71. Id. at 8. Policy reasons include the need to protect the parties reasonable reliance,
the desirability of giving effect to the parties' reasonable understanding at the time of con-
tracting, and administrative convenience. Id.
1080
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should allow parol evidence to alter certain formal contracts, and in
order to differentiate between these various circumstances, they broke
the formal contracts category into two major subcategories: 1) contra-.
dictions, where the extrinsic evidence in some way contradicts the writ-
ten contract, and 2) interpretation problems, where the written contract
contains ambiguous terms. Contradictions were subdivided further into
three parts: a) substitutions (direct substitution of an alleged prior agree-
ment in place of the reasonable, unambiguous meaning of the written
contract), b) variations (alteration of the written contract with evidence
of, for example, course of dealing or usage of trade), and c) side agree-
ments (nothing in the written agreement deals with the subject matter
of the extrinsic evidence). The subdivisions as such represent the full
continuum of contradictions. 72
1. CONTRADICTIONS
a. Substitutions
Substitutions, the first of the contradiction subdivisions, occur
when one of the parties attempts to substitute alleged' prior understand-
ings for the reasonable, unambiguous meaning of the written contract
language. This is the one instance in which Childres and Spitz assert
that courts should apply the parol evidence rule strictly and diligently
in order to preserve the integrity of formal written contracts.7 3
1972 substitution cases: In almost all of the thirteen substitution
cases surveyed by Childres and Spitz, the court did not allow parties
to substitute alleged prior understandings for the reasonable meaning
of the contract language in question.74 For instance, the court applied
the parol evidence rule to prevent the attempted substitution when: 1)
a buyer attempted to substitute a $5,400 price term found in one of
the earlier agreements for a $5,700 term in a later one;7 5 2) a plaintiff
sought to bind a defendant to an alleged prior oral promise that certain
shares were in fact registered with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission although the contract spoke only of plans :for registration;7 6
and 3) a party attempted to contradict the clear terms of an assign-
ment.7
7
72. Id. at 8-15.
73. "[T]he parties must be held to their mutual expectations at the time of con-
tracting" in order to "prevent the substitution of alleged prior agreements for the clear mean-
ing of the writing." Id. at 9.
74. Id. at 9, 10. Courts in 11 of the 13 cases found parol evidence inadmissible.
75. Id. (citing Brady v. Black Mountain Inv. Co., 459 P.2d 712 (Az. 1969)).
76. Id. (citing Oglesby v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1969)).
77. Id. at 10 (citing Wm. G. Wetherall, Inc. v. Kramer, 256 A.2d 919 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1969)).
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. Wisconsin formal substitution cases: Wisconsin courts in the 1980s
and early '90s found parol evidence inadmissible in all eight of the
formal substitution cases. In Dairyland Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Bohen,78
for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that even if parol
evidence were permitted on the issue of integration, 79 the parol evi-
dence rule still bars evidence that goes to the nature of the agreement
in which the written agreement itself is clear and unambiguous.8 0 Dair-
yland Equip. involved two corporations which had entered into a lease
agreement. One of the corporations, Spring Valley Meats, subsequently
declared bankruptcy, at which time Dairyland Equipment Leasing
moved to recover equipment upon which Spring Valley had defaulted.
At trial, the court allowed the receiver for Spring Valley, Bohen, to
introduce an affidavit to show that the written agreements entered into
by the companies were intended only as a partial integration of agree-
ment. Specifically, the affidavit stated that the written agreements were
not actually leases; instead, they were lease-purchase agreements which
would have allowed Spring Valley to retain ownership of the equip-
ment.8' The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, stating that testimony
relating to an oral agreement between the companies was received in
violation of the parol evidence rule.82
In one of the few opinions with explicit reference to a party's
status,8 3 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held in Kowalski v. Mierow
Enterprises84 that, absent claims of duress, fraud, or mutual mistake,
the presence of an integration or merger clause in a written agreement
makes that document a complete integration of the parties' intent, and
parol evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements is thus inad-
missible.8 5 Similarly, the court of appeals in Wisconsin Power and Light
Co. v. Ciphrex8 6 stated that evidence of an alleged contemporaneous
78. 288 N.W.2d 852 (Wis. 1980).
79. See supra text accompanying note 61.
80. Dairyland Equip., 288 N.W.2d at 856. When the contract terms are ambiguous,
however, parol evidence is admissible. Id. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 853.
82. Id. at 856. See also Univest Corp. v. General Split Corp., 435 N.W.2d 234 (Wis.
1989) (finding when the parties intended that the written leases embody their entire agreement,
the parol evidence rule bars the consideration of evidence allegedly explaining or altering the
parties' contractual obligations); Osiris, Ltd. v. Tri-Trend Products, Inc., No. 86-0291 (Wis.
Ct. App. Mar. 24, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (finding the parol evidence rule
prohibits a party from introducing evidence of a prior oral contract in order to attempt to
substitute one party for another in the final written contract).
83. The court referred to the appellant as "an experienced businesswoman."
84. No. 83-714 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file).
85. See also Marohl Construction v. International House of Pancakes, No. 85-0863,
(Wis. Ct. App. May 14, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (not admitting parol evidence
because the presence of an unambiguous integration clause represents an agreement between
the parties that the writing was the final, complete and conclusive expression of their intent).
86. No. 88-0165 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1990) (LEXIS, States Library, Wisc file).
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oral agreement which directly contradicts the express terms of a written
signed contract is not admissible under the parol evidence rule.87 Fi-
nally, in St. Joseph Bank and Trust Co. v. Occidental Development
Ltd.88 the court of appeals held that when the meaning of a "due-on-
sale" clause in a mortgage agreement between a developer and mortgage
company is unambiguous, a party may not introduce parol evidence
which modifies the clause.
The parties in these substitution cases all possessed a certain level
of business expertise. This sophistication arguably carries with it the
awareness that a contract is not a revocable expression of intent; rather,
the contract indicates a solemn intent to be bound by its terms.8 9 The
Childres and Spitz article and Wisconsin cases demonstrate that so-
phisticated parties who sign written agreements will generally not suc-
ceed in substituting parol evidence contradicting the language of the
written agreement. Instead, the parties will be bound by the terms of
the written agreement regardless of what their true intentions may have
been.
b. Variations
Variations, the next subdivision under contradictions, differ some-
what from substitutions. Variations cases often involve the additional
question of whether contract language was meant to be a complete
statement of rights and obligations of the parties.90 Childres and Spitz
assert that, as in substitution cases, courts should generally not admit
parol evidence in variations cases. Because contracting parties some-
times make certain assumptions based on course of performance,
course of dealing, and usage of trade,91 and fail to make certain terms
87. Both parties in Wisconsin Power and Light were corporations, sophisticated in
contractual matters, but the defendant had only one shareholder-its president. Insofar as
the defendant might be considered not sophisticated in such matters, the fact that he entered
into complex negotiations and agreements with the assistance (presumably) of attorneys
bumps his corporation into the sophisticated (i.e., formal) category for purposes of this analy-
sis. See supra note 70.
Similarly, although the husband and wife defendants in Merit Holstein Joint Venture
v. Rosemarie Conklin, No. 90-0137 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1990) (LEXIS, States library,
Wisc file) were likely unsophisticated, the disputed written agreement (a transfer of interest)
appears to have been drafted fairly and in detail, presumably by an attorney. The case thus
belongs in the formal category, and because the defendants attempted to substitute contra-
dictory terms for the unambiguous terms in the writing, the court found the parol evidence
inadmissible. See supra note 70.
88. No. 83-1214 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file).
89. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 10.
90. Id. at 11.
91. See also U.C.C. § 1-205 (defining course of dealing and usage of trade); § 2-
202(a) (stating a final writing may be explained or supplemented by course of dealing or
usage of trade); § 2-208(1) (stating course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without
objection shall be relevant in determining the meaning of the agreement).
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explicit in the contract, courts should not enforce the parol evidence
rule as strictly as in substitution cases. 92 If a party can prove reliance
on course of dealing or usages of trade, the court should admit the
parol evidence and allow the finder of fact to resolve the question of
completeness.93
1972 variations cases: In each of the four variations cases in the
Childres and Spitz survey, the court applied the parol evidence rule
strictly, forbidding extrinsic evidence to vary the contract language. In
one case, for example, because the defendant was a sophisticated party
to a deliberately prepared and negotiated contract, the Washington
Supreme Court did not allow a defendant subcontractor to assert that
a risk of loss clause was understood by the parties to include certain
requirements not stated in the contract.94 In none of these variations
cases were the parties able to convince the courts that they relied on
usages of trade or courses of dealing. To the extent they may have had
legitimate arguments, Childres and Spitz suggest the courts in these
variations cases came close to abusing the parol evidence rule by not
allowing the parties to present their evidence.95
Wisconsin variations cases: There were only three variations cases
in the Wisconsin survey, and of those, the court found parol evidence
admissible in two. 96 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied the ad-
mission of parol evidence in Milwaukee Valve Co. v. Mishawaka Brass
Mfg.,97 a case in which a party selling copper ingots adamantly asserted
that the parties had agreed orally to normal delivery terms (as under-
stood in the trade) or, alternatively, that both parties had presumed
normal delivery terms. 98 Because the trial court determined that the
attempted variation contradicted delivery terms specified in the pur-
chase order accepted by both parties,99 it did not allow the parol evi-
dence. Again, to the extent that the seller may have had a legitimate
argument about usage of trade, the court arguably should have allowed
parol evidence in order to understand the true intentions of the parties.
92. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 11.
93. Id. at 12.
94. Id. at 11 (citing Grant County Constructors v. E.V. Lane Corp., 459 P.2d 947
(Wash. 1969)). Similarly, the Arizona Court of Appeals refused to allow a bonding company
to insert a fifteen-day limitation into a criminal bond, id. at 12 (citing State v. Hervey, 456
P.2d 953 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)), and a Michigan court refused to allow successors to a ninety-
nine year lease to vary the clear meaning of a lease provision which would adjust rental
payments in the event of a devaluation of the dollar. Id. (citing Avery v. J.L. Hudson Co.,
169 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)).
95. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 12.
96. The Wisconsin results in this category diverge from the Childres and Spitz
results, in which courts admitted parol evidence in none of the four variations cases. See
supra notes 94-95 .and accompanying text.
97. 319 N.W.2d 885 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
98. Id. at 888.
99. Id.
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The same court, however, allowed parol evidence in what could
be considered a customary usage of trade case,' °° Cobb State Bank v.
Nelson. 10 The Cobb court allowed testimony from a bank officer ex-
plaining the customary practice in the banking industry regarding the
renewal of bank notes. The testimony also corroborated evidence from
bank records as to a debtor's outstanding debt.l0 2 Insofar as the tes-
timony did not directly contradict explicit terms in the agreement, but
instead merely explained the terms, the court's allowance of parol evi-
dence in this case was arguably correct. 0 3
Similarly, in Coveau v. Durand,"°4 the appellate court allowed the
signer of a check, who was acting on behalf of an organization 05 whose
name was on the check, to present parol evidence to prove the parties
understood the signer would not be personally liable.' 06 The Coveau
court, after considering facts on the record that indicated the corpo-
ration named on the check had purchased logs from the other party
on at least fifty prior occasions, implied that the corporation was fore-
closed from looking to the individual signer because it had presumably
looked to the corporate entity, not the individual, on those prior oc-
casions. ' 07
The Wisconsin courts thus appear more willing to consider usage
of trade and course of dealing arguments as grounds for admitting parol
evidence than were the courts in the Childres and Spitz survey. Insofar
as the evidence aids the finder of fact in ascertaining the true intentions
of the parties, this would appear to comport with the approved modem
trend. 108
c. Side agreements
Side agreements, the third subdivision under formal contradic-
tions, involve the situation where nothing in the written contract deals
100. This also could be considered an informal case (i.e., one of the parties was
unsophisticated), so the court's decision in allowing parol evidence to prove the terms of the
agreement in the absence of a merger clause was still correct. See infra notes 160-61 and
accompanying text.
101. 413 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
102. Id. at 645.
103. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
104. 432 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
105. The court did not cite the RESTATEMENT, but RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 320 (195 Supp. 1990-91) suggests that an individual acting with actual or apparent
authority would not be personally liable: ". . . a person making or purporting to make a
contract with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the
contract."
106. Coveau, 432 N.W.2d at 662.
107. Id. The court also found that the check itself was ambiguous, so the parol
evidence was also justified on grounds of ambiguity. See supra note 65 and accompanying
text.
108. See supra notes 41-49.
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with the subject covered by the extrinsic evidence. 109 Childres and Spitz
assert that in such cases the court should assume the contract is not
complete and allow parol evidence except in those cases in which the
contract itself explicitly specifies that it is the complete agreement be-
tween the parties (i.e., the contract contains a merger clause)."I 0
1972 side agreements cases: The courts in twelve of the fifteen
Childres and Spitz side agreements cases11 allowed parol evidence.
For example, in Reports Corp. v. Technical Publishing Co.,112 the Sev-
enth Circuit upheld the trial court's finding that the parties to a contract
for the sale of the plaintiff's publishing company had intentionally omit-
ted an oral agreement concerning the plaintiff's obligation to a previous
owner." 3 Parol evidence was thus admissible to show the parties did
not intend the writing to be complete and to help prove "essential
particulars" not included in the written contract. 14 Childres and Spitz
point out that this and other similar holdings in the side agreements
subdivision were consistent with the proposition that "[t]he existence
of a writing does not warrant the assumption that the agreement in-
corporates the full understanding of the parties"-after all,
"[b]usiness[people] should be free to choose between writing complete
agreements and agreements which are not complete.''1I
Wisconsin side agreements cases: In Wisconsin, the court allowed
parol evidence in all four of the surveyed side agreements cases, lending
support to the Childres and Spitz proposition that the parol evidence
rule does not (and should not) apply in such instances. For instance,
in Midwest Business Brokers, Inc. v. Knispel,116 the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals found there was a disputed material issue of fact as to
whether the parties, a couple seeking to sell their business and a real
estate brokerage, I  had entered into a contemporaneous oral agree-
ment allowing them to rescind the written contract. The court held that
parol evidence of this side agreement was admissible to show whether
the contract was intended to be the complete and final expression of
the parties' intent." 18
Similarly, the court in Gordon v. Maddux Properties' 19 found parol
evidence admissible to prove the existence of an oral agreement about
109. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 12.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 13-14 n.47-56.
112. 411 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1969).
113. Id. at 173.
114. Childres & Spitz supra note 1, at 13 (citing Reports Corp., 411 F.2d at 172).
115. Id.
116. No. 88-1977 (Wis. Ct. App. May 2, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file).
117. The contract in Knipsel is close to being informal, but it is placed in the formal
category because the defendants operated through their attorney in their dealings with the
brokerage. See also supra note 70.
118. See also Kohlenberg v. American Plumbing Supply Co., 263 N.W.2d 496, 501
(Wis. 1978).
119. No. 88-1112 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file).
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an occupancy date under a lease when the written lease contained lan-
guage dealing only with a building's completion date. The court found
that the absence of such language was evidence that the written lease
was only a partial integration. 20
In sum, in those instances where nothing in the contract deals with
the subject covered by the outside evidence, the Wisconsin courts (like
the courts in the Childres and Spitz survey before them) refuse to apply
the parol evidence rule strictly. The courts' allowance of parol evidence
in such side agreements cases, as it was in variations cases, 121 is in
keeping with the modem trend of seeking to understand the true in-
tentions of the parties.' 22
2. INTERPRETATION
The second formal contract subcategory concerns the interpreta-
tion of contract terms. Some commentators suggest that courts as a
matter of course should first ascertain the meaning of the writing before
invoking the parol evidence rule to exclude evidence, because it is
impossible to determine whether evidence contradicts, as opposed to
supplements, a writing until one knows what the writing means. 23
Stated simply, these commentators argue that parol evidence is ad-
missible whenever necessary to interpret ambiguous contract lan-
guage. 124
1972 interpretation cases: Courts in eleven of the twelve Childres
and Spitz cases falling within this category allowed parol evidence.' 25
One group involved the interpretation of contracts lacking relevant
language dealing with the disputed issue. Another group involved the
interpretation of ambiguous contract terms. In the former group,
LaSalle and Koch Co. v. Doyle 26 involved a dispute about the duration
of a contract, but the contract itself said nothing about its duration.
27
Childres & Spitz assert that in such a case a court should hear parol
evidence to determine what the time term was and, if there was none,
120. Id. at *4 (citing Dairyland Equip., 288 N.W.2d at 855). See also Heritage Bank
v. Recom, No. 87-1047 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1988) (LEXIS States library, Wisc file)
(admitting parol evidence to show the written documents were not intended as a full and
final expression of the agreement); Liturgical Publications, Inc. v. Continental Leasing, Inc.,
No. 83-1346 (Wis. Ct. App. May 25, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (admitting parol
evidence when there is ample evidence that a written lease agreement does not contain all
of the terms and conditions of the agreements among the parties).
121. See supra notes 96-108.
122. See supra notes 41-49.
123. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 23, at 352.
124. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 14; CORBIN, supra note 2, § 542.
125. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 14-16 n.58-66.
126. 413 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1039 (1970).
127. Id. at 14 (citing LaSalle & Koch Co., 413 F.2d at 346).
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what a reasonable time would be. 2 ' Courts generally follow this po-
sition today. 129 In the latter group, the Jones v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co.1 30 court allowed parol evidence to help interpret the meaning of
"customer," 131 and the United States v. Jacobs'3 2 court allowed it to
interpret the term "beneficiary."' 133 Insofar as courts seek to enforce
the true intentions of the parties,134 these holdings were proper.
Wisconsin interpretation cases: Wisconsin courts in the 1980s and
1990s have allowed parol evidence to prove the terms of ambiguous
contracts in four of the five formal interpretation cases. In Karstaedt's
Garage Inc. v. G.E.M. Contracting, Inc., 135 for instance, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals allowed parol evidence to clarify the terms of a formal
lease-purchase agreement because the writings were ambiguous and
contained contradictory terms. 136
In City of Oconto Falls v. Selmer Construction,13 however, the
same court implied that the trial court erred in admitting parol
evidence' 38 to resolve an ambiguity in a formal contract. The court
concluded that the error did not affect the verdict and allowed it to
stand. Although the outcome in Selmer Construction was proper, the
reasoning was flawed because the appeals court implied that the trial
court may have erred in admitting parol evidence to clarify an ambi-
guity.
In sum, Wisconsin courts almost always allow parol evidence in
formal cases, with the significant exception of formal substitution cases.
This would suggest that, in Wisconsin, the importance of the distinction
between formal and informal contracts is matched by the importance
of the distinction between substitution and non-substitution cases. The'
results of the survey involving the following Wisconsin informal con-
tracts cases further supports this assertion.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing e.g., CORBIN, supra note 2, § 579).
130. 76 Cal. Rptr. 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
131. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 15 (citing Jones, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 786).
132. 304 F.Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
135. No. 88-1151 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file).
136. See also Siva Truck Leasing, Inc. v. Hennes Trucking Co., Inc., No. 84-2546
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (finding that if the court finds
language of the writing to be ambiguous, the trier of fact may examine parol evidence to
determine the intent of the parties); Schmitz v. Grudzinski, 416 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Wis. 1987
(inferring parol evidence is admissible to prove intent in the case of ambiguous terms);
Martinson v. Hanson, No. 82-647 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc.
file) (finding the'term "excavate basement to grade" in a construction contract sufficiently
ambiguous to warrant consideration of parol evidence).
137. No. 90-0530 (Wis. Ct. App. Sep. 18, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file).
138. The parol evidence consisted of a standard form agreement between a building
owner and a contractor.
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B. Informal Contracts
The second major category in the Childres and Spitz hierarchy
addresses informal contracts, or contracts where one or both parties
lack business sophistication. Forty cases in their sample (approximately
27%) fell into this category.' 39 Childres and Spitz assert that due to the
parties' lack of sophistication in such transactions, courts can determine
the parties' true intentions and expectations at the time they entered
the agreement only by shaping the parol evidence, rule to an informal
model, not by forcing the informal contract to conform to a rule de-
signed for keenly negotiated, formal transactions' 40 In other words,
they suggest that courts should ignore the parol evidence rule in in-
formal contracts cases, and allow extrinsic evidence to help determine
what the parties' intent was at the time of contracting.
1972 informal cases: The cases surveyed in 1972 overwhelmingly
supported the position that courts should ignore the parol evidence rule
in informal contract cases.' 4 ' Childres and Spitz assert, in fact, that the
most significant finding of their entire study was the marked inconsis-
tency between decisions in the area of informal contracts and those in
the formal contracts category.' 42 Indeed, when deciding informal cases,
courts ignored some of the very factors they regarded as decisive in
excluding alleged oral agreements in formal contracts. 43 For instance,
at least five of the informal contract cases' 44 involved contradictions
in the strict sense-that is, substitutions. Whereas substitutions in the
formal context merited courts' strict application of the parol evidence
rule,' 45 in each of the five informal contract cases the courts held the
parol evidence rule inapplicable. 4 6 In seven of the forty Childres and
139. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 17.
140. Id.
141. Courts in only three of the forty informal cases found parol evidence inadmis-
sible. Id. at 23, 24 n.98-104. (See Mason v. Blayton, 166 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969) (not
allowing parol evidence to prove a personal check was intended by both parties to be a sham);
Ehrlich v. American Moninger Greenhouse Mfg. Co., 298 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1st Dep't 1969)
(mem.) (finding parol evidence inadmissible to prove that a note and guaranty were intended
by both parties to be shams); LaVoie v. Celli, 304 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (finding
parol evidence inadmissible to prove the parties had orally agreed that a note would not
become due for a certain designated time)). Childres and Spitz suggest the courts' usage of
the parol evidence rule in these three decisions was clearly wrong, because they did not allow
disputed factual issues to go to the finder of fact. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 23.
142. Id. at 17. For example, none of the forty decisions assumed that a contract was
a complete, total integration of the parties' intentions. Id. at 19 n.80 (citing e.g., Schnug v.
Schnug, 454 P.2d 474 (Kan. 1969); Thomson v. Parrish, 221 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969)). The authors concluded these results provide convincing evidence of the inapplicability
of the formal model to informal transactions. Id. at 19.
143. Id. at 17.
144. See Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 17, 18 n.72-75.
145. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
146. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 18. See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying
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Spitz informal cases 147 the courts invoked the ambiguity exception 148
as their rationale for admitting parol evidence. Childres and Spitz imply
that in these cases the ambiguity rationale was merely a means for the
courts to come to the "right" decision, since none of the seven contracts
were ambiguous to the point of controversy. 149 The significance of these
cases is that courts in certain cases seem use the ambiguity exception
as a tool to circumvent the strict application of the parol evidence
rule. 150
Wisconsin informal cases: The courts in the Wisconsin survey
found parol evidence admissible in twenty of the twenty-five informal
contract cases,' 5 ' lending credence to the Childres and Spitz conclusion
that courts will almost always find a way to admit parol evidence in
informal cases.' 5 2 Of those twenty-five cases, seven involved the am-
biguity exception. In Duhame v. Duhame,153 for example, the Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals allowed parol evidence to prove that a husband
and wife intended to provide in their divorce settlement for their minor
children in the event of the husband's death. The court justified its
decision in part by finding that several stipulations in the settlement,
regarding, among other things, the naming of beneficiaries, were am-
biguous.154 Implicit in the court's rationale was the recognition that
text for discussion of the Wisconsin courts' very different handling of informal substitution
cases.
147. Id. at 19 n. 81.
148. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
149. Id. at 19. That is, none of the contracts contained terms which were susceptible
to two or more discrete meanings. See, e.g., Estrada v. Darling-Crose Machine Co., 80 Cal.
Rptr. 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (finding the term "sale" in this informal contract was am-
biguous, when in fact the agreement's language was unmistakable); Davies v. Courtney, 463
P.2d 554 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (finding a promise to pay a "former note of $1,600" to be
ambiguous). Childres & Spitz, supra note 1 at 19, 20 n.82, 83.
150. Childres and Spitz would suggest the "certain instances" are those in which one
or both of the parties to the contract are unsophisticated in the ways of business (i.e., the
contract is informal). Id. at 17.
151. The five cases that did not allow parol evidence involved attempted substitu-
tions. See infira note 168 and accompanying text.
152. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 24.
153. 453 N.W. 2d 149 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
154. Id. at 152. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. See also Conley v. Polk
County, No. 87-1934 (Wis. Ct. App. June 7, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (admitting
parol evidence to prove intent when the terms of an employment contract are ambiguous);
Lind v. Simma, No. 85-1488 (Wis. Ct. App. July 15, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file)
(admitting parol evidence to interpret ambiguous terms such as "valuable consideration");
Dickfoss v. Pfrang, No. 03-1363 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc
file) (finding that when the language of a written instrument is ambiguous, a court is not
restricted to the language on the instrument); Polk County Bank v. Bauer, No. 83-600 (Wis.
Ct. App.. Mar. 10, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (finding the term "financing ar-
rangement" in a contract ambiguous because it is not defined or explained in the contract);
Hoffman v. Intertractor America Corp. No. 86-2214 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1988) (LEXIS,
States library, Wisc file) (allowing parol evidence to prove the nature of an ambiguous em-
ployment agreement; i.e., whether the agreement is a term contract or an open-ended, em-
ployment-at-will contract).
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the parties to a divorce may be unsophisticated in legal matters, and
that courts should relax the parol evidence rule in such cases.' 55
Courts in several informal contract cases allowed parol evidence
on the grounds that the written contract was only a partial integration
of the parties' intent. 5 6 The court of appeals in Boe v. Edgewood,
Inc., 157 for example, found the parol evidence rule did not bar the
court's consideration of evidence outside of the four corners of a teach-
er's written, single-page contract. The plaintiff teacher, an unsophisti-
cated party for the purposes of this analysis, sought to include the
employment handbook as evidence. By assuming that the single-page
contract was not the total integration of the parties' intent and con-
cluding that the handbook was part of the contract and admissible as
evidence,158 the court strengthened the proposition that the parol evi-
dence rule generally lacks clout in Wisconsin informal contracts cases
and that courts will use various justifications in order to circumvent
the rule. 159
155. "A stipulation (in the divorce settlement or judgment) is in the nature of a
contract and the trial court must seek a construction which will effectuate what appears to
have been the intention of the parties." Duhame, 453 N.W.2d at 151 (citing Richards v.
Richards, 206 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Wis. 1973)).
The court in Webb v. Webb, 434 N.W.2d 856 (Wis. 1988) similarly upheld the trial
court's allowance of parol evidence to aid in the interpretation of an ambiguous written
antenuptial agreement.
156. See Federal Deposit Insur. Corp. v. First Mortgage Investors, 250 N.W.2d 362
(Wis. 1977) for the general statement of this principle in Wisconsin.
157. No. 87-0595 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file).
See also Teubert v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, No. 84-1156 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 28,
1986) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (admitting parol evidence to prove whether the writing
was intended to be the total integration of the parties' agreement); Christopher v. Williamson,
No. 85-0568 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (admitting parol
evidence to prove whether a written land contract was intended as the parties' final agree-
ment); Schultis v. Safro, No. 84-1845 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1985) (LEXIS, States library,
Wisc file) (admitting parol evidence to prove whether a promissory note was only a partial
integration of the parties' agreement).
158. Boe (Wis. Ct. App. LEXIS 336 at *5).
159. See e.g., Champion v. Lillegren, No. 86-0334 (Wis. Ct. App. June 4, 1987)
(LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (admitting parol evidence to show whether the parties
intended for promissory notes to create a binding obligation); Bauman v. Rondou, Wolfgang
and St. Croix Boatworks, No. 84-1790 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1986) (LEXIS, States library,
Wisc file) (admitting parol evidence to prove misrepresentation on the part of one of the
parties); Kelleher v. Hanson, No. 84-2544 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1986) (LEXIS, States library,
Wisc file) (admitting parol evidence to show whether a contract is indeed a mortgage); Kerner
v. Milwaukee Malleable & Grey Iron Works, No. 85-1583 (Wis. Ct. App. July 9, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Wisc file) (admitting parol evidence to show whether the parties truly intended
to contract, or instead intended the writing as a mere sham); Nutter v. Young, No. 89-0313
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (allowing parol evidence
when the underlying contract is not properly admitted into evidence); Keller v. Milbauer,
No. 83-1312 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (admitting parol
evidence to show that a deed, though absolute in form, was intended by the parties as security);
Kaiser v. Sampson, No. 83-1465 (Wis. Ct. App. June 13, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc
file) (same); Conry v. Coutts, No. 82-1767 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 1984) (LEXIS, States
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Ironically, the liberal allowance of parol evidence can, on occasion,
work against the unsophisticated party in informal contract cases. In
Cobb State Bank v. Nelson, ' 60 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court's strict application of the parol evidence rule and held
that a bank may introduce parol evidence to prove the terms of a note
issued to a private individual.' 6 1 The court cited Dairyland
Equipment'62 extensively, stating that parol evidence is admissible to
prove the parties' intent, and the parol evidence rule is not applicable
unless the writing is a total integration. 163 The liberal allowance of parol
evidence in informal cases thus does not always work against the in-
terests of the sophisticated party-occasionally the facts are such that
the admission of the evidence disadvantages the unsophisticated party,
a result which seems only equitable. 164
In informal substitution'65 cases Wisconsin courts appear to de-
viate significantly from the Childres and Spitz conclusion that courts
will virtually always. allow parol evidence in informal cases. In the
seminal Federal Deposit Insur. Corp. v. First Mortgage Investors 66 case,
for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that parol evidence is
admissible to establish the full agreement of the parties, with the lim-
itation that the parol evidence must not conflict with the part of the
agreement that has been integrated in writing. 67 The court does not
suggest or imply that this standard should be applied any differently
for sophisticated parties than for unsophisticated parties, a fact which
suggests that the courts will apply the parol evidence rule equally strin-
gently in both informal and formal substitution cases.' 68
library, Wisc file) (admitting parol evidence to establish mutual mistake in a reformation
action).
160. 413 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
161 Even if the private individual in Nelson is considered a sophisticated party (the
facts in the opinion do not elaborate on the circumstances), the court's decision in allowing
parol evidence is arguably correct, because the parol evidence dealt in part with a variation
(see supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text) which hinged on customary practice within
the banking trade. Id. at 645.
162. Dairyland Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Bohen (In re Spring Valley Meats, Inc.), 288
N.W.2d 852 (Wis. 1960). See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
163. Cobb State Bank, 413 N.W.2d at 646.
164. See also Hoffman v. Intertractor America Corp., No. 86-2214 (Wis. Ct. App.
Feb. 24, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (admitting parol evidence to clarify an
ambiguity concerning terms of employment). See supra note 154.
165. See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text for the courts' treatment of formal
substitutions in both the Childres & Spitz and the Wisconsin surveys.
166. 250 N.W.2d 362 (Wis. 1977).
167. Id. at 366. See also, Dairyland Equip., 288 N.W.2d at 855 (finding parol evidence
admissibility subject to the limitation that the parol evidence received may not conflict with
the part of the agreement that has been integrated in writing).
168. In the relatively rare instances when Wisconsin courts do not allow parol evi-
dence in informal cases, the facts involve a party who is trying to substitute contradictory
evidence for the clear meaning of the written agreement. See, e.g., Rock County Savings &
Trust, Co. v. Ramsey, No. 84-1895 (Wis. Ct. App. May 15, 1986) (LEXIS, States library,
1092
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From a policy standpoint, the advisability of this position is subject
to debate. On one hand, Childres and Spitz would argue the courts
should soften their stance in informal substitution cases by allowing
parol evidence of the parties' intent and then deciding the issue on the
basis of credibility. 169 If, as Corbin and other commentators suggest,
the courts' primary goal should be to ascertain the true intentions of
the parties, 170 the Wisconsin position as articulated in Federal Deposit
Insurance Co. and Dairyland Equipment is exceedingly "hard-line." If,
on the other hand, the courts' goal should be .to preserve the integrity
of the written contract, even in the face of evidence showing that the
parties had some other intention, as Williston and Corbin suggest, 171
the Wisconsin court's position is appropriate. 172
The Wisconsin position is arguably preferable to the Childres and
Spitz position on the issue of admissibility of parol evidence in informal
substitution cases. Substitution refers to a party's attempt to directly
replace the reasonable meaning of the contract language with some
other meaning. 173 Even a relatively unsophisticated party presumably
understands that an explicit statement in a written contract does not
implicitly mean the converse or something totally inconsistent with
that statement. Even if the unsophisticated party signs the agreement
on the basis of an agent's false assurances, the Wisconsin position does
not unfairly discriminate against that party. If the unsophisticated party
does not understand the written contract, or in some way feels misled
by the other party, the allegation of abuse-of-baraining-power 74 is
Wisc file) (citing Dairyland Equip. 288 N.W.2d at 856) (finding inadmissible parol evidence
of an oral agreement which conflicts with a written agreement, even if offered to disprove
integration); Marks v. Saltness, American Family Mutual Insur. Co., No. 84-1045 (Wis. Ct.
App. June 4, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (finding in the absence of sufficient
grounds (e.g., allegation of duress) for setting aside an unambiguous signed damage release,
an injured party may not offer parol evidence to attempt to contradict the release); Symes
v. Symes, No. 89-0712-FT (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file)
(finding inadmissible parol evidence contradicting a signed, written divorce stipulation re-
garding child support payments if the stipulation is unambiguous); Waukesha State Bank v.
Bell, No. 84-1393 (Wis. Ct. App. May 15, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (finding
when terms of a mortgage are clear on its face, parol evidence is not admissible to vary the
terms); Michels Fin. Corp. v. Link, No. 83-1814 (Wis. Ct. App. May 16, 1985) (LEXIS, States
library, Wisc file) (finding inadmissible parol evidence modifying the terms of a lease if that
lease contains a clear integration clause).
169. "A litigant should have the chance-in informal contracts cases-to present his
evidence before a judge assesses credibility." Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 24.
170. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 35-36 and accompanying text.
172. The policy of protecting commercial writings might be traced to several factors.
The policy, inter alia, enforces the "home office's" control and command of agreements made
by field personnel (i.e., promises made by salespeople beyond their authority will not be
honored); reflects judicial distaste for "secret agreements" because of their propensity to do
harm to the public or to third parties; and allows simple expediency (i.e., the policy provides
a means for courts to avoid complicated questions). Sweet, supra note 27, at 1050-51.
173. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 9.
174. See infra notes 179-97 and accompanying text for full discussion of abuse-of-
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always available. This reasoning depends, of course, on the court's
adherence to a Childres and Spitz-like scheme-i.e., parol evidence
should always be admitted in cases involving legitimate allegations of
abuse-of-bargaining-power or fraud.
In sum, courts in the Childres and Spitz 1972 survey and this
Comment's Wisconsin survey almost always circumvented the parol
evidence rule in informal contracts cases, whether by claiming ambi-
guity, partial integration or some other justification.175 When the courts
in the Childres and Spitz survey did not circumvent the rule, their
decisions were based not so much upon the admissibility of the extrinsic
evidence as on the credibility of the particular parties. 176 Although
credibility is occasionally cited by Wisconsin courts as a factor in their
decisions not to circumvent the rule in informal cases, 177 the decisions
are more often predicated on the fact that a party was attempting to
substitute contradictory terms for the presumably unambiguous terms
of a written contract. ' 78
C. Abuse-of-Bargaining-Power Contracts
The third major category in the classification scheme addresses
contracts involving abuse of the bargaining process. 179 Fifty cases, or
33.5% of the total 1972 survey, fell within this category. 180 According
to Childres and Spitz' 8 1 and other authorities, including the Wisconsin
Supreme Court,' 82 the parol evidence rule does not apply in situations
bargaining-power contracts. The court should always admit parol evidence when a party
legitimately alleges abuse-of-bargaining-power. (See supra note 58 and accompanying text).
175. See supra notes 154, 156-57 and accompanying text.
176. Childres and Spitz assert that courts that allow summary judgment on the basis
of credibility under the guise of the parol evidence rule disserve the system because such
holdings confuse and corrupt contract litigation. They further assert that judges have a time
and place to rule on credibility, but that time and place is not the motion stage of the trial.
Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 24.
177. See e.g., Michels Fin. Corp.v. Link, No. 83-1814 (Wis. Ct. App. May 16, 1985)
(LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (viewing evidence of an integration clause together with
other factors and deciding that the party seeking to introduce parol evidence to prove the
existence of a supplemental clause in a lease was not credible); Christopher v. Williamson,
No. 85-0568 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 1986) (LEXIS, States Library, Wisc file) (finding the
party alleging that a written land contract constituted only a partial integration of the parties'
agreement "was the more credible witness"). See supra notes 168 and 157, respectively.
178. See supra note 165-68 and accompanying text.
179. This category includes adhesion contracts, "unconscionable" contracts, con-
tracts objectionable on other public policy grounds and contracts involving misrepresentation
and duress. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 5.
180. Id. at 25-30 n.108-46.
181. Id. at 24 (see Grande v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.2d 1022, 1027 (7th Cir.
1971)).
182. Federal Deposit Insur. Corp. v. First Mortgage Investors, 250 N.W.2d 362 (Wis.
1977). See supra note 58 and accompanying text (i.e., terms of the writing may not be varied
or contradicted unless there is allegation of fraud or duress).
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involving a disparity in the bargaining position or expertise of the
parties. The party who alleges inferior bargaining position or an abuse
of discretion usually gets his or her evidence to the judge or jury.18 3
1972 abuse-ofbargaining-power cases: Courts refused to allow the
parol evidence rule to prevent the parties from producing evidence of
unfair treatment in all but seven of the fifty abuse-of-bargaining-power
cases surveyed by Childres and Spitz.18 4 In one of the seven cases in
which courts did not allow parol evidence, Lakeshore, Inc. v. Sara-
fyan, 185 the court enforced a cancellation term that it acknowledged
was contrary to the expressed understanding of both parties, saying that
because a lessor had gone so far as to seek and receive written modi-
fication of one clause of his apartment lease, the oral modification of
another clause could not be explained by parol evidence.'8 6 In other
words, the unsophisticated lessee lost on his bid to introduce parol
evidence simply because he had previously modified a written clause
in his lease.
Wisconsin abuse-of-bargaining-power cases: Wisconsin courts vir-
tually always allow parol evidence when a party alleges abuse-of-bar-
gaining-power, regardless of the parties' status.' 87 The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court allowed parol evidence in a 1990 case, Bank of Sun Prairie
v. Esser,'8 8 in which an unsophisticated party who had not read the
fine print of a guaranty agreement alleged fraudulent misrepresentation
on the part of a bank. The court held that in such cases parol evidence
is admissible, and the determination of whether the unsophisticated
party justifiably relied on the bank's representations is properly a ques-
tion of fact for the jury.'8 9
Similarly, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in H & M Italian Food
Corp. v. General Growth Development Corp. 190 held oral parol evidence
183. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 24. "This is true even when the parties have
attributes which would place them in our formal category." Id. n. 106 (citing Hester v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 412 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1969); Briskman v. Del Monte Mortgage Co.,
458 P.2d 130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969); Abbott v. Abbott, 174 N.W.2d 335 (Neb. 1970)).
184. Id. at 25. See, e.g., Sherman Car Wash Equip. Co. V. Maxwell, 297 F. Supp 712,
715 (E.D.Pa. 1969) (asserting that when there is evidence of a party's unscrupulous conduct,
the Court is required "to examine all of the circumstances attending the execution of the
agreement").
185. 225 So. 2d 15 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
186. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 28 (citing Lakeshore, 225 So. 2d at 19).
187. The Wisconsin courts in this Comment's survey allowed parol evidence in nine
of ten such cases. See Federal Deposit Insur. Corp., 250 N.W.2d at 365, for the general
statement of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's position on abuse-of-bargaining-power (e.g.,
fraud, duress) contracts.
188. 456 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. 1990).
189. Id. at 588-89. The court implied that the party's status was a consideration in
its decision, stating that "all the circumstances must be considered, including the intelligence
and experience of the ... individual." Id. at 589.
190. No. 88-1257 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file).
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admissible in a case of alleged intentional deceit even though the evi-
dence was in direct conflict with a formal written real estate lease gov-
erned by the statute of frauds. The court rationalized "equity will not
permit the statute designed to prevent fraud to be used as an instrument
of fraud."' 19 By so holding, the court further reinforced the tendency
in Wisconsin for courts to allow parol evidence in almost any instance
in which there is a legitimate allegation of fraud, misrepresentation or
other abuse.192
Circumstances do exist, however, in which the court will not admit
parol evidence when a party alleges misrepresentation. In Ritchie v.
Clappier,193 for example, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, under the
theory of negligent reliance, 194 barred a licensed real estate broker who
failed to read a contract from making a claim of misrepresentation. In
Ritchie the court stated that it must consider all the circumstances,
including the intelligence and experience of the misled individual and
the relationship between the parties, when determining whether the
individual acted reasonably in relying upon the misrepresentation.' 95
After considering the facts, the court essentially determined that a real
estate broker, presumably sophisticated in the ways of business, should
have known to have read the contract carefully. 196
In sum, Wisconsin courts, like the courts surveyed in 1972 by
Childres and Spitz, will almost always allow parol evidence in cases
where one of the parties alleges abuse-of-bargaining-power on the part
of the other.' 97
191. Id. at *5 (citing Estate of Rogers, 140 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Wis. 1966)).
192. See also First Nat. Bank of Wis. Rapids v. Dickinson, 308 N.W.2d 910, 914
(Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (admitting parol evidence to prove a bank charged a usurious rate of
interest on a loan, even though the writing itself did not indicate usury); Hamman Constr.
Co. v. Noller & Sons, No. 86-0702 (Ct. App. Wis. Mar 4, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc
file) (allowing parol evidence to prove the existence of misrepresentation in the terms of a
construction contract); Pentler and Rubnitz v. Hahn, No. 85-0180 (Ct. App. Wis. Oct. 15,
1986) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (finding an allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation
on the part of one of the parties to a real estate deed is grounds for the court's admission of
parol evidence); Bauman v. Rondou, No. 84-1790 (Ct. App. Wis. Feb. 18, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Wisc file) (refusing to apply parol evidence rule to exclude evidence of negligent
misrepresentation); Barribeau v. Hansen Auto Sales, No. 84-2225 (Ct. App. Wis. Jan 14,
1986) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (not applying the parol evidence rule in cases in which
tortious misrepresentation is alleged); Paulson v. Gonnering, No. 83-1912 (Ct. App. Wis.
Aug. 28, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (admitting parol evidence to prove verbal
misrepresentation); Polk County Bank v. Bauer, No. 83-600 (Ct. App. Wis. Mar. 10, 1984)
(LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (finding fraudulent inducement is appropriate grounds for
a court's admission of parol evidence).
193. 326 N.W.2d 131 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
194. "Negligent reliance" in such cases involves the proposition that a person who
fails to read a written contract is precluded from defending against liability by claiming
misrepresentation. Bank of Sun Prairie, 456 N.W.2d at 589 n.2.
195. Ritchie, 326 N.W.2d at 134.
196. Id. Failure to read the writing is a vexing problem and "no simple pattern
emerges from the cases." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.14, at 248 (1990).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 179-96.
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D. Misapplication of the Parol Evidence Rule
A group of cases that Childres and Spitz placed in the formal
category dealt with the courts' misapplication of the parol evidence
rule. 198 Since the parol evidence rule does not apply to subsequent
changes, 199 any reference to the rule as justification in such cases is
blatant error.2 °° Another misapplication occurs when the rule is used
as a device to defeat contract claims when the alleged contradiction is
immaterial to those claims.2 10
1972 misapplication cases: Eight of the fifty-nine formal cases sur-
veyed by Childres and Spitz involved subsequent modifications of writ-
ten documents. In two of those eight cases, the court incorrectly ex-
cluded the proffered evidence on grounds that the parol evidence rule
prohibited admission of the evidence. 20 2 The court in the other six
cases correctly recognized that the parol evidence rule does not apply
to subsequent modifications.
Wisconsin misapplication cases: Wisconsin courts misapplied the
parol evidence rule in two cases.2 03 In one of those two, FPC Securities
Corp. v. Hemmings,204 the court considered whether the rule should
bar the admission of the defendant's affidavit which spoke of a sub-
sequent agreement at the plaintiffs board meeting that the defendant
was to be released from a contract.205 The affidavit contradicted the
minutes of the board meeting, which did not indicate any action by
the board to release the defendant from the contract.20 6 Although the
court correctly found the lower court's granting of summary judgment
for the plaintiff was in error because the affidavit raised disputed items
of material fact, 207 it improperly applied a parol evidence rule analysis
to the question of whether the evidence in the affidavit was admissible
198. This Comment places the misapplication subcategory in a section unto itself
instead of in the formal category because a court's characterization of subsequent agreements
as inadmissible under the parol evidence rule is inappropriate regardless of the parties' status.
199. "[I]t is unanimously agreed that the parol evidence rule applies to prior expres-
sions, and has no application to an agreement made subsequent to the writing.... Calamari
& Perillo, supra note 23, at 335 (citing e.g., CORBIN, supra note 2, § 574; WILLISTON, supra
note 32, § 632). See also supra note 14.
200. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 16.
201. Id. at 16.
202. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 16 n.67 (citing Kopelman v. Sigel, 297 N.Y.S.2d
793 (1st Dep't 1969), affd 260 N.E.2d 550 (1970); C & N Trading Co. v. Johnston Fur
Dressing Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1969)).
203. The Wisconsin courts misapplied the parol evidence rule in two of the six formal
and informal cases in which a party invoked the rule to exclude evidence of an agreement
subsequent to the original agreement. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
204. No. 87-0862 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar 17, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file).
205. Id. at *1.
206. Id.
207. Id. at *2.
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to impeach the minutes of the board meeting.2 8 Because the alleged
agreement was subsequent to the original contract, the commentators
would suggest the parol evidence rule does not apply.20 9 The Wisconsin
courts in the remaining four cases correctly held the parol evidence
rule forbids the use of only prior or contemporaneous, not subsequent,
agreements.210
IV. CONCLUSION
The Childres and Spitz conclusion that parties' status influences
courts' parol evidence decisions is generally viable in Wisconsin today.
Of the fifty-nine Wisconsin appellate cases decided since 1980 that
considered the parol evidence rule, the courts found parol evidence
admissible in just ten of the twenty that involved "formal" contracts.21'
Of the ten formal cases in which the courts found parol evidence not
admissible, eight were "substitution" cases (i.e., the proffered parol
evidence directly contradicted the unambiguous language of the written
agreement). In no instance did a court allow parol evidence in a formal
substitution case.
By contrast, Wisconsin courts found parol evidence admissible in
twenty of the twenty-five informal cases,212 nine of the ten abuse-of-
bargaining-power cases, 213 and two of the six misapplication cases.
2 14
Significantly, all five of the informal cases in which courts did not allow
parol evidence were substitution cases. 215 These results suggest some-
thing of a departure from the Childres and Spitz conclusions. Specifi-
cally, the fact that Wisconsin courts found parol evidence inadmissible
in a majority of combined formal and informal substitution cases sug-
gests that the distinction between substitution and non-substitution
cases is as important in Wisconsin as the distinction between formal
and informal cases. That is, the nature of the proffered parol evidence
is a significant factor in courts' analysis of the parol evidence rule.
208. See also Lange Drywall, Inc. v. Skyline Builders, Inc., No. 84-442 (Wis. Ct. App.
Nov. 5, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (excluding evidence of alleged subsequent
changes to the original unambiguous contract on parol evidence grounds).
209. See supra note 199-200 and accompanying text.
210. Weber v. Bastogne Sausage, No. 83-1144 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1985) (LEXIS,
States library, Wisc file); Ellickson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 83-1104 (Wis. Ct.
App. Sep. 25, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file); Eagle River State Bank v. Guardian
State Bank, No. 83-2042 (Wis. Ct. App. July 3, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file);
Kowalski v. Mierow Enters., No. 83-714 (Wis. Ct. App.Apr. 4, 1984) (LEXIS, States library,
Wisc file).
211. See supra notes 78-89; 96-108; 116-20 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 151-68 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
215. Overall, the courts found parol evidence admissible in only three of the eight
informal substitution cases. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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The empirical results of the survey are striking, when one considers
the courts rarely make any mention of status in their decisions. The
data as a whole carry implications for parties and attorneys litigating
and courts deciding parol evidence issues in Wisconsin. By understand-
ing that Wisconsin parol evidence decisions follow the patterns set forth
in this Comment, attorneys can better prepare for litigation by at-
tempting to characterize their clients' status and parol evidence ac-
cording to whether they wish to have the court admit parol evidence.
An attorney seeking to have a Wisconsin court admit parol evidence,
for instance, should characterize the client as unsophisticated in the
ways of business (i.e., the contract is informal) and the parol evidence
as anything (e.g., a variation, side agreement, abuse-of-bargaining-
power) but a substitution. By understanding that, their parol evidence
decisions follow certain patterns, courts give themselves additional ra-
tionale to circumvent or uphold the rigid application of the parol evi-
dence rule.
Courts could assure a more just, rational result if they would accept
the proposition that no single unitary parol evidence rule can be ex-
pected to operate across all status lines. Parol evidence, which is prop-
erly excluded in formal substitution cases such as Dairyland Equip.216
and informal substitution cases such as Marks21 7 is properly admitted
in informal cases such as Boe218 and abuse-of-bargaining-process cases
such as Bank of Sun Prairie.2 19 Such acknowledgement by the courts
would accomplish two worthy objectives: 1) it would allow more ac-
curate prediction of prospective decisions, and 2) it would clear the
way for more rational, just decisionmaking in all the categories. 220
216. Dairyland Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Bohen (In re Spring Valley Meats, Inc.), 288
N.W.2d 852 (Wis. 1980). See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
217. Marks v. Saltness, No. 84-1045 (Wis. Ct. App. June 4, 1985) (LEXIS, States
library, Wisc file). See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
218. Boe v. Edgewood, Inc., No. 87-0595 (Wis. Ct. App.Apr. 21, 1988) (LEXIS, States
library, Wisc file). See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
219. Bank of Sun Prairie v. Esser, 456 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. 1990). See supra notes 187-
89 and accompanying text.
220. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1, at 31.
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Category Cases evidence evidence
FORMAL
Substitution 8 0 0%
Variation 3 2 57%
Side Agreement 4 4 100%
Interpretation (ambiguity) 5 4 80%
Total 20 10 50%
INFORMAL
Substitution 8 3 37%
Non-substitution 17 17 100%
Total 25 20 80%
ABUSE OF
BARGAINING POWER 10 9 90%
POTENTIAL
MISAPPLICATION 6 4 67%
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